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“the relations of the petitioner and Moss as co-owners of the
tract of land mentioned were not harmonious and litigation
between them appeared probable….”19  Accordingly, the two
co-owners entered into a contract providing for a public sale
of the property involved.20
As the Board of Tax Appeals observed, the taxpayer “sold
nothing” and merely purchased the remaining interest.21  As
with the later revenue ruling,22 the Board of Tax Appeals
stated that “the only effect at the auction as to this acreage
was to establish the price at which the petitioner purchased
the undivided interest of Moss [the other co-owner]
therein.”23  As a consequence the taxpayer neither realized a
taxable gain nor sustained a deductible loss from the sale of
the taxpayer’s interest in the land.24
In conclusion
The two primary authorities, R v. Rul. 55-7725 and
Hunnicutt v. Comm’r,26 indicate that a selling co-owner of
property who purchases the property in a partition and sale
proceeding or other public auction recognizes neither gain
nor loss as to the property interest sold.  That is highly
important for heirs who find themselves faced with a co-
owner who wants out of the co-ownership arrangement but
the parties are unable to agree upon the terms of sale.  The
selling co-owner who intends to acquire the property in a
partition and sale action or in a public auction can rest
assured that the transaction does not trigger gain (and will not
produce a deductible loss).
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
DISCHARGE .The debtor had granted a security interest
in most of the debtor’s farm property to a bank. The debtor
also purchased farm supplies on credit from a supplier. The
supply credit was unsecured until the debtor told the
supplier that the debtor was having a hard time paying bills.
The supplier asked the debtor to grant a security interest in
the debtor’s crops to collaterize the supply debt, which the
debtor voluntarily agreed to do. The debtor was able to
plant another crop without any additional debt and scaled
back the farm operation and moved to a cheaper residence
to decrease expenses. The debtor sold most of the crop to a
third party who was not listed as a potential buyer on the
security agreement with the supplier; however, the debtor
sold some of the crop to the supplier who allowed the
debtor to keep the proceeds. The debtor used the proceeds
of the sale of crop to the supplier to pay other debts of the
farm. The supplier sought a ruling that the debt to the
supplier was nondischargeable for willful and malicious
injury to the supplier’s security interest in the crops. The
court found that the debtor’s actions were focused on
saving the farm as a viable operation, had taken several
steps to reduce expenses and costs, was not aware that the
law required the debtor to supplement the list of potential
buyers if the crop was sold to a non-listed buyer, and was
not aware that use of the proceeds for farm debts was not a
permitted use of the proceeds of collateral. Therefore, the
court held that the debtor did not willfully or maliciously
harm the supplier and the debt was dischargeable. In re
Crump, 247 B.R. 1 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2000).
FEDERAL TAX     -ALM § 13.03[7].*
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The IRS had filed two tax liens
against the debtor’s property prepetition. The debtor sought
to avoid the liens under Section 522(f)(1) as impairing the
debtor’s exemptions. The court held that Section 522(f)(1)
could not be used to avoid a federal tax lien because (1) the
li n is created by statute and is not a judicial lien and (2)
under North Carolina law, the exemptions are inapplicable
as to federal tax liens; therefore, no exemptions are
impaired by the tax lien. In reMorgan, 2000-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,596 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. 2000).
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ALLOCATION OF PAYMENTS FOR TAXES. The
debtors filed for Chapter 7 and owed personal income taxes
as well as an I.R.C. § 6672 penalty as responsible persons
in a corporation which failed to pay employment taxes. The
corporation’s main asset was its subscribers in the
corporation’s pager business. Another company agreed to
purchase the customer base for $55 a name if the debtors
agreed to sign a noncompetition agreement and $10 a name
if the debtors did not sign the noncompetition agreement.
The debtors argued that the difference in price was their
personal asset and should have been used to reduce their
Section 6672 liability. The trustee agreed to seek the
allocation of the proceeds of the sale to the IRS such that
the price difference would be applied to the employment
taxes first. The IRS refused to allocate the proceeds other
than to the debtors’ tax claims and the debtor sought a
ruling from the court to force the allocation. The court held
(1) the debtors did not have standing to bring the action
because the allocation would not benefit the bankruptcy
estate; (2) the proceeds of the customer list sale were
property of the estate; and (3) the court had no authority to
force allocation of Chapter 7 payments to the IRS. In re
Applied Paging Technologies, Inc. v. United States,
2000-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)  ¶ 50,587 (D. N.J. 2000).
DISCHARGE .The debtor originally filed a Chapter 13
case on February 25, 1993, but dismissed the case on June
1, 1995. The present Chapter 7 case was filed on August
27, 1997 and the debtor sought a ruling that 1991 and 1992
taxes were dischargeable as due more than three years
before the Chapter 7 filing. The Bankruptcy Court held that,
under the plain language of the statute, Section
507(a)(8)(A)(i), the previous bankruptcy case did not toll
the three year period. The Bankruptcy Appeals Court
reversed, holding that the clear Congressional intent was
that the IRS was to have a full three years to collect a tax
and that the Section 507 three year limitation was tolled
during the previous bankruptcy case. The appellate court
reversed, holding that the courts should not attempt to alter
the plain, unambiguous language of the statute which does
not provide for any tolling of the three-year period by the
filing of prior bankruptcy cases. In re Palmer, 2000-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,588 (6th Cir. 2000), rev’g 228 B.R.
880 (Bankr. 6th Cir. 1999).
NET OPERATING LOSSES. Five months before filing
for Chapter 7 in March 1995, the debtor filed the income
tax return for 1993 and made the election to carry forward
all net operating losses (NOLs) in that year. If the NOLs
had been carried back, the debtor would have been entitled
to over $200,000 in refunds, far more than if the NOLs
were carried forward. The Chapter 7 trustee filed income
tax returns for the estate and claimed a refund based on the
carry back of the NOLs. When the IRS disallowed the
carrybacks, the trustee sought avoidance of the NOL
election by the debtor as a fraudulent transfer. The court
held that (1) the NOL election was a transfer, (2) NOLs are
an interest in property of the debtor or the estate, (3) the
election was a fraudulent transfer because the debtor did not
receive a reasonably equivalent value for the election and
the debtor was insolvent at the time of the election. The
court also held that the transfer of tax attributes under
I.R.C. § 1398 did not restrict the trustee’s avoidance powers
under Section 548. Therefore, the court held that the NOL
electi  could be avoided by the trustee in favor of
allowing the trustee to carry the NOLs back to earlier tax
years. In re Feiler, 2000-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,579
(9th Cir. 2000), aff’g, 230 B.R. 164 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1999), aff’g, 218 B.R. 957 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1998).
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
HOG WASTE LAGOON. The defendant operated a
large hog confinement facility and deposited the hog wastes
into a lagoon. The lagoon was located over old
underground tile lines which had become broken, allowing
the hog wastes to seep into the tile line and be discharged
into the Iowa River. The defendant was fined under Iowa
Code § 455B.191 for the discharge. The defendant argued
that the trial court had improperly applied a strict liability
standard and should have used only a negligence standard.
The defendant claimed that the defendant should not be
held liable for not knowing that the tile was damaged. The
defendant also argued that, if the statute imposed strict
liability, the stricter standard should apply only to incidents
of direct discharge of waste into a river or stream. The court
held that (1) the statute imposed strict liability in all cases
of discharge of waste that pollutes waters of the state and
(2) a tile line qualified as a water of the state, under Iowa
Code § 455B.171(32). State ex. rel. Miller v. DeCoster,
608 N.W.2d 785 (Iowa 2000).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BIOMASS ENERGY . The CCC seeks comments
concerning the establishment of a bioenergy program to
expand agricultural markets by promoting increased
production of bioenergy through ethanol and biodiesel.
Using the authority of the CCC Charter Act, which states in
part, that CCC is authorized to use its general powers to
“increase domestic consumption of agricultural
commodities by expanding or aiding in the expansion of
domestic markets for agricultural commodities…,” CCC
proposes to make incentive cash payments to bioenergy
producers who increase their purchases of eligible
agricultural commodities, as compared to the corresponding
period in the prior fiscal year and convert that commodity
into increased bioenergy production. 65 Fed. Reg. 46115
(July 27, 2000).
FARM LOANS . The following letter addresses a concern
raised in the May 12, 2000 issue of the Digest by Neil Harl:
Dear Mr. Secretary,
We are writing to express our concern about a recent
decision by the Farm Service Agency to alter its
interpreta ion of the provisions of the Debt Collection
Improvement Act of 1996 with respect to eligibility for the
marketing assistance loan and loan deficiency payments.  In
a notic  (LP-1729) issued on March 21, 2000, the agency
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instructed its state and county offices to withhold
commodity loans and LDP’s from any producer with
delinquent Federal non-tax debt.  We believe that this
decision was an overly broad interpretation of the Act, and
ask you to rescind it.
We do not agree that the language in the provision which
refers to “...loans, loan insurance or guarantees” was
intended by Congress to include USDA’s marketing
assistance loan program or loan deficiency payments
received by farmers in lieu of participation.  The descriptor
`marketing assistance’ is crucial to understanding this
distinction--this program was designed to help farmers
market their products after harvest time, when prices tend to
rise.  Since the marketing assistance loans are fully
collateralized by the physical commodity, farmers’
financial ability to repay the marketing assistance  loans or
outstanding loans is not jeopardized by their participation in
this program.  In fact, denying these farmers the benefits of
the marketing assistance loan program unduly constrains
their ability to market successfully, which seems clearly
inconsistent with the objective of the Act.
Absent an affirmative decision to rescind FSA’s March 21
notice, we urge you to seriously consider a waiver of this
regulation, as is permitted under statute.  In light of
Congressional acknowledgement of continued economic
stress in American agriculture by broad support of the
economic assistance package on May 25, enforcement of
this notice would send contradictory signals to farmers
struggling to survive in farming.  We understand that
producers of winter wheat nationwide who remain
delinquent on non-tax Federal debt are already affected by
LP-1729, so prompt action on your part is critical. Letter to
Secretary Dan Glickman from Senators Tom Harkin,
Bob Kerrey, Tim Johnson, Max Baucus, Larry Craig,
Pat Roberts, and Tom Daschle, July 26, 2000.
TOBACCO . The AMS has adopted as final regulations
which add a new provision to the grade standards for baled
flue-cured tobacco, establish bale dimensions and spacing
requirements, and revise the poundage adjustment for a
warehouse selling in excess of the sales schedule for
designated and undesignated tobacco. 65 Fed. Reg. 46085
(July 27, 2000).
FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAX
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION . The decedent had
established a charitable remainder annuity trust with the
decedent as annuitant to receive 5 percent of the value of
the trust corpus each year. As the trust was established, the
trust qualified for a charitable deduction. However, during
the four years of the trust’s existence, no distributions were
made to the decedent. At the decedent’s death, the trust
provided for secondary annuitants who would receive the 5
percent payments if the annuitants agreed to pay the estate
taxes resulting from the payments. The secondary
annuitants, except one, declined the annuities. The
annuitant who accepted, however, refused to pay any taxes
and threatened a lawsuit to receive the annuity. The trustee
reached a settlement and agreed to pay the taxes from the
trust. The court held that the estate was not eligible for a
chari able deduction for the trust because the 5 percent
annuity was not paid and the charitable remainder holder
did not receive all the remainder of the trust, because some
f the trust was used to pay the taxes on the one secondary
annuit nt’s payments. Estate of Atkinson v. Comm’r, 115
T.C. No. 3 (2000).
DISCLAIMER . The taxpayer was the great-grandchild
of the decedent and was the remainder beneficiary of a trust
established by the decedent’s will for the taxpayer’s parent.
The parent died and the taxpayer learned about the
remainder interest shortly thereafter. Within nine months
after learning about the vesting interest in the trust, the
taxpayer disclaimed a fractional share of the interest in the
principal of the trust. The taxpayer, however, retained the
right to the share of trust income and the remaining interest
in the trust principal. The IRS ruled that the disclaimer of
the fractional share of the interest in trust principal was not
a gift. Ltr. Rul. 200029048, April 25, 2000.
GIFT . The decedent’s will provided for property passing
in a QTIP trust to the spouse. The spouse objected to the
handling of the estate and the trustee’s refusal to distribute
trust corpus to the spouse. The parties reached a settlement
under which the spouse received cash for the spouse’s share
of the estate including the QTIP trust. The release of the
spouse’  interest in the QTIP trust was considered a sale of
the interest in the trust. The settlement provided that any
gift tax from the transaction would be paid by the other
h irs. The IRS ruled that the spouse’s release of the interest
in the QTIP trust resulted in a gift to the extent that the
value of the trust interest exceeded the consideration paid
for it, including the gift tax paid by the other heirs. Ltr.
Rul. 200027001, March 3, 2000.
The taxpayer had originally sold real estate to the
taxpay r’s children for a downpayment and a promissory
note. However, the taxpayer returned the downpayment
checks and never attempted to collect on the note. The
children executed a mortgage for the taxpayer and the
taxpayer released the mortgage when one child needed to
secure a loan on the property. When the checks were
returned an accompanying letter referred to the purchase of
the real estate by the children and a gift of only the
downpayment. The IRS filed a tax lien against the
taxpayer’s property and the issue was whether the taxpayer
had any attachable interest in the property when the tax lien
was filed. The court held that if the transaction was a
purchase, the taxpayer still had a right of payment which
was subject to the lien. However, if the taxpayer had
forgiven the entire note, no interest remained to be attached.
The court held that the facts were insufficient to grant either
party a summary judgment prior to trial. Uni ed States v.
Jepsen, 2000-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,608 (W.D.
Ark. 2000).
MARITAL DEDUCTION . The decedent’s will provided
for property passing in a QTIP trust to the spouse. The
spouse objected to the handling of the estate and the
trustee’s refusal to distribute trust corpus to the spouse. The
parties reached a settlement under which the spouse
Agricultural Law Digest 117
received cash for the spouse’s share of the estate including
the QTIP trust. The release of the spouse’s interest in the
QTIP trust was considered a sale of the interest in the trust.
The spouse had received some income distributions from
the trust and had agreed to reduce the amount received in
the settlement by the amount of income distributions
already received. The IRS ruled that the income from the
trust could not be considered part of the sale of the trust
proceeds. The IRS also ruled that the spouse’s basis in the
income interest in the trust did not include any adjustment
under I.R.C. §§ 1014, 1015, 1041. The sale proceeds were
long-term capital gain but did not include pre-sale income
distributions. Ltr. Rul. 200027001, March 3, 2000.
TRUSTS. The taxpayers, husband and wife, each
established a grantor retained annuity trust (GRAT). Each
trust provided that if the annuitant died with a surviving
spouse, the surviving spouse would continue as annuitant.
Each trust also allowed the grantor the power to revoke the
remainder annuity for the surviving spouse. The taxpayers
valued the remainder interests of both trusts using both
lives. The court held that a qualified annuity interest had to
set a certain term in order to qualify the trust as a GRAT.
Because the lifetime of the secondary annuitant was
uncertain and could be revoked, the GRATs had to be
valued using a single life. Cook v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. No.
2 (2000).
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
PROPOSED LEGISLATION. Legislation has been
introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives which (1)
increases the deduction for health insurance to 100 percent
for self-employed individuals; (2) provides for the
exclusion of up to $500,000 in gain from the sale of
qualified farm property; (3) excludes income averaging for
farmers from increasing the alternative minimum tax; (4)
provides for deductions for contributions to a Farm and
Ranch Risk Management account (FARRM); (4) repeals
the federal estate, gift and generation-skipping transfer
taxes; (5) repeals the step-up in basis of inherited property;
(6) allows a step-up in basis of up to $1,300,000 in
inherited property and up to $3,000,000 of property
inherited by a surviving spouse; (7) decreases the maximum
federal estate and gift tax rate to 50 percent for estates over
$2,500,000 with phase-in of future reductions; (8) replaces
the unified credit with the unified exemption amount, an
amount of adjusted estate which is exempt from gift and
estate tax, increased from $675,000 in 2001 to $1,000,000
in 2006; and (9) provides for deemed allocation of GST
exemption amounts to indirect skip lifetime transfers. H.R.
4885.
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS-ALM §
4.02[14]. The taxpayers had filed a lawsuit in tort and
contract against their employer for wrongful termination of
employment and had received a jury award for
compensatory and punitive damages. The taxpayers had
agreed to pay their attorneys on a contingency fee basis and
a portion of the award was paid to the attorneys. As in
Coady v. Comm’r, 2000-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,528
(9th Cir. 2000 (Alaska attorney fee lien)) see p. 101 supra,
the court looked at the nature of the attorney’s lien created
by statute in California and held that the lien did not create
a sufficient property interest in the jury award to exclude
the fees from the taxpayers’ income. Dr. Harl will publish
an article on this issue in the next issue of the Digest.
Benci-Woodward v. Comm’r, 2000-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,595 (9th Cir. 2000).
The taxpayer was a surviving heir of a decedent killed in
an automobile accident. The taxpayer received a payment
from the driver’s insurance company for “bodily and
p rsonal injuries, damage to property, and the consequences
thereof.” The IRS ruled that the payments could be
excluded from income as resulting from a claim for
personal injuries. Ltr. Rul. 200029020, April 18, 2000.
The taxpayers had brought a suit against a TV station for
defamation and had received a jury award which included
actual and punitive damages and interest. The case was
appealed but the station reached a settlement with the
taxpayers before the appeal was heard. The taxpayers had
hired their attorneys on a contingent fee basis and paid
them from the settlement proceeds. The taxpayers excluded
all of the settlement proceeds from their income. The Tax
Court had allocated the settlement proceeds to the types of
damages and interest in the same proportion as the original
jury award and included the entire attorney fee in the
taxpayers’ income. The appellate court held that it was
bound to follow the precedent of Cotnam v. Comm’r, 263
F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959) which held that attorney
contingency fees were excludible from income. The
Cotnam court reasoned that the contingency fee
arrangement transferred the taxpayers’ rights in the award
sufficiently to remove the fees from the taxpayers’ income.
The court also noted that this concept is independent of the
state law lien rights granted attorneys’ fee. This issue
remains deeply divided among the courts. Dr. Harl will
publish an article on this issue in the next issue of the
Digest. Srivastava v. Comm’r, 2000-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,597 (5th Cir. 2000).
DEPRECIATION. The taxpayers purchased rental real
estate and held the property for over fourteen years. The
taxpayers made capital improvements to the property. The
taxpayers did not claim any depreciation deductions for the
entire fourteen years. The taxpayers sold the property and
deducted from the sale proceeds the property and water
taxes owning against the property. The taxpayers used their
undepreciated basis to determine that the sale of the
property produced a loss. The court held that the real estate
taxes and water taxes were not chargeable against the sale
proceeds. In addition, the court held that the taxpayers’
basis in the property had to be decreased by the amount of
depreciation deductions allowable over the fourteen years.
Thus, the sale of the property produced gain to the
taxpayers. Jakubowski v. United States, 2000-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,604 (D. Colo. 2000).
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS. The taxpayer was
the sole shareholder of two S corporations which operated a
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marina and a mobile home park. Both businesses eventually
failed, with the corporations both owing money to the
taxpayer. The taxpayer admitted that, in 1992, the taxpayer
no longer owed the money to the corporations. However,
the taxpayer provided no evidence of payment of the loans
and provided no other evidence of the loan transactions
with the corporations. The taxpayer also failed to prove that
the taxpayer was insolvent when the loans were discharged;
therefore, the court held that the taxpayer had discharge of
indebtedness income which was not excluded from the
taxpayer’s income. Toberman v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
2000-221.
A partnership was formed to construct, acquire and lease
commercial property. The partners executed recourse
promissory notes and personal guarantees for the
partnership debt. The partnership business faltered and the
lender eventually accepted the proceeds of the sale of the
partnership property for the debt; however, the lender
retained a right to recover on the guarantees from the
partners. In a Chief Counsel Advice letter, the IRS ruled
that no discharge of indebtedness had yet occurred because
the lender had the right of recovery from the partners. CCA
Ltr. Rul. 200028019, April 14, 2000.
EARNED INCOME CREDIT . This Chief Counsel
Advice letter involved two situations. In the first situation,
the taxpayers were married and claimed EIC. The taxpayers
were eligible for the EIC except that one taxpayer did not
have a valid Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN) issued
by the Social Security Administration (SSA). The taxpayer
was issued a valid TIN after the return was filed. In the
second situation, a single taxpayer with a qualifying child
claimed the EIC. The taxpayer was eligible for the EIC
except that the child did not have a valid TIN from the SSA
until after the return was filed. In both cases, the IRS ruled
that the taxpayers can file amended returns and claim the
EIC, using the valid TINs. CCA Ltr. Rul. 200028034,
June 9, 2000.
HOBBY LOSSES-ALM  § 4.05[1].*  The taxpayers,
husband and wife operated two businesses, a dental practice
and an apple orchard. The taxpayers operated the dental
practice and the orchard as a partnership. The taxpayers
combined the income and expenses of both activities on one
partnership return. In most tax years the dental practice was
reported on Schedule C and the orchard on Schedule F, but
in one tax year, both activities were reported on Schedule F.
The taxpayers claimed that the activities were related in that
the taxpayers recommended that their patients eat apples
and gave or sold apples to the clients. The court held that
the dental practice was not sufficiently related to the
orchard activity to allow the activities to be combined as
one business for income tax purposes. The court also held
that the orchard activity was not engaged in for profit,
based on the following factors: (1) the taxpayers did not
keep accurate and full production records; (2) the taxpayers
kept only a “canceled check” record of business
transactions; (3) the only changes to the orchard operation
were made to decrease the work load of the taxpayers and
not to make the activity more profitable; (4) the taxpayers
had little experience or expertise in growing apples and did
not seek sufficient expert assistance; (5) the taxpayers did
not spend sufficient amount of time on the activity to fully
harvest the apples; (6) the orchard had never produced a
profit; and (7) the taxpayers had substantial income from
the dental practice which was offset by the losses from the
orchard activity. The court denied deductions related to the
orchard activity in excess of the income from the activity.
The appellate court affirmed in an opinion designated as not
for publication. Zdun v. Comm’r, 2000-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,580 (9th Cir. 2000), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1998-
296.
IRA . The taxpayer owned an IRA in the taxpayer’s sole
name. The taxpayer withdrew all of the funds in the IRA
and tr nsferred them to the taxpayer’s spouse who did not
transfer them to an IRA in the spouse’s name. A few days
later, the taxpayer and spouse executed a stipulation for a
judgment for divorce and the divorce was granted six
months later. The taxpayer did not include the IRA
distribution in income. The issue was whether the IRA
distribution was excludible from income under I.R.C. §
408(d)(6). The taxpayer argued that the transfer of the
money qualified as a transfer of an interest in the IRA. The
court held that once the funds were withdrawn from the
IRA, the taxpayer no longer had an interest in the IRA. The
court held that Section 408(d)(6) required the transfer of the
IRA itself and the continuance of the IRA in the name of
the former spouse, in order for Section 408(d)(6) to apply.
The taxpayer was also required to pay the I.R.C. § 72(t) 10
percent addition to tax for the early withdrawal of funds
from the IRA. Jones v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-219.
INHERITANCE . The taxpayer was the surviving
spouse of the decedent. The decedent’s will provided for
property passing in trust to the spouse. The spouse objected
to the handling of the estate and the trustee’s refusal to
distribute trust corpus to the spouse. The parties reached a
settlement under which the spouse received cash for the
spouse’s share of the estate. The IRS ruled that the money
was not included in income because the payment
represented the spouse’s share of the estate. Ltr. Rul.
200027001, March 3, 2000.
INTEREST . The taxpayer was a member of a home
owners a sociation which was responsible for maintenance
of common areas. The association was a non-stock
corporation incorporated under state law. The association
decided o demolish a common building and rebuild the
building by borrowing money. The association members
would be assessed an additional amount each month to
cover th  cost of paying the loan principal and interest. The
m mbers were not personally obligated on the loan and the
members’ homes were not collateral for the loan. The IRS
ruled that the taxpayer’s share of the interest paid was not
eligibl  as qualified residence interest and was not
deductible by the taxpayer. Ltr. Rul. 20029018, April 18,
2000.
JURY FEES . In a National Service Center Advice letter,
the IRS ruled that fees received for jury duty are included in
gross income but are not subject to income tax withholding
and are not included in earned income for earned income
credit purposes. NSCA Ltr. Rul. 200028035, June 14,
2000.
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PENSION PLANS. The IRS has ruled that a deferred
compensation plan did not fail to qualify as an “eligible
deferred compensation plan” merely because deferrals were
made under an arrangement that allowed a fixed percentage
of an employee’s compensation to be deferred on the
employee’s behalf under the plan, unless the employee
affirmatively elected to receive the amount in cash.
However, the obligation to make the deferrals for a month
must be established before the beginning of the month,
either by an automatic election or by an agreement to alter
the terms of the automatic election and to receive cash in
lieu of the deferrals. Rev. Rul. 2000-33, I.R.B. 2000-33.
For plans beginning in July 2000, the weighted average is
5.99 percent with the permissible range of 5.39 to 6.29
percent (90 to 106 percent permissible range) and 5.39 to
6.59 percent (90 to 110 percent permissible range) for
purposes of determining the full funding limitation under
I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice 2000-31, I.R.B. 2000-1274.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
August 2000
AnnualSemi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 6.37 6.27 6.22 6.19
110 percent AFR 7.02 6.90 6.84 6.80
120 percent AFR 7.66 7.52 7.45 7.40
Mid-term
AFR 6.33 6.23 6.18 6.15
110 percent AFR 6.97 6.85 6.79 6.75
120 percent AFR 7.62 7.48 7.41 7.37
Long-term
AFR 6.22 6.13 6.08 6.05
110 percent AFR 6.85 6.74 6.68 6.65
120 percent AFR 7.50 7.36 7.29 7.25
Rev. Rul. 2000-38, I.R.B. 2000-__.
PRODUCT LIABILITY
FRONT END LOADER.  The plaintiff was injured
while using a tractor front end loader to move round hay
bales. The loader was manufactured by the defendant but
was not equipped with an optional bale clamp. The plaintiff
used a homemade fork attachment. The plaintiff was
injured when a bale fell on the plaintiff as the loader raised
up accidentally, allowing the bale to fall back onto the
tractor, while the plaintiff was distracted by an obstruction
behind the tractor. There was no evidence that the loader
controls allowed the loader to rise by itself. The loader
carried warnings about the danger of using the loader to
move hay bales without the use of the clamp. The evidence
also showed that the plaintiff knew about the danger of
transporting bales without the clamp and had used similar
equipment to move bales with a clamp. The defendant
argued that it had no liability because the warnings were
adequate for the plaintiff, based on the plaintiff’s
experience. The court held that summary judgment for the
defendant was proper because the plaintiff demonstrated no
defect in the loader or the warnings which gave rise to the
accident. See also Delaney v. Deere & Co., 985 F. Supp.
1009 (D. Kan. 1997). Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d
930 (Kan. 2000).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
AGISTER LIEN. The defendant had purchased pasture
land subject to a pre-existing lease. The tenant had
contracted with the plaintiff to pasture cattle on the land
and had received payment for that pasturing. However, the
tenant did not make any rent payments. The defendant
notified the tenant that it was asserting an agister’s lien on
the cattle until the rent was paid. After learning about the
default on the rent, the plaintiff cancelled the pasturing
contract and attempted to remove the cattle but the
defendant prevented the removal, based on its agister’s lien.
The court held that no agister lien was available, under
Wyo. Stat. § 29-7-101(a), because the defendant did not
provide any pasture grass to the plaintiff’s cattle in that,
under the lease, the possession of the pasture grass had
passed to the tenant. The court noted that to hold otherwise
would place the plaintiff in the position as guarantor of the
rent, even after the plaintiff had paid the tenant for use of
the pasture. Panhandle Feeders v. C & D Enterprises, 1
P.3d 647 (Wyo. 2000).
TRESPASS
TIMBER. The defendant was a survey company which
performed a survey for land neighboring the plaintiff’s
property. During the survey, the defendant’s employee cut a
three foot path through brush and tree saplings to create a
line-of-sight path. The evidence showed that 312 saplings
of various kinds of trees were cut but the only evidence of
the value of the trees was an estimate by the plaintiff of
about $25 each. There was no evidence presented as to the
value of the property before and after the cutting. The trial
court had awarded the plaintiff $3,000 for the trees. The
appellate court held that the award was improper for lack of
specific evidence of the value of the trees. The court noted
that there was no evidence of the size, type, age and height
of any of the trees before they were cut.  The court held
that, on remand, if the value of the cut trees could not be
determined, the amount of damages would be the loss of
fair market value of the property, if any. Brand v. Mathis
& Associates, 15 S.W. 3d 403 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
CITATION UPDATES
Davis v. Comm’r, 210 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2000),
a f’g, T.C. Memo. 1998-248 (court awards and
settlements) see p. 85 supra.
Land O’Lakes, Inc. v. Hanig, 610 N.W.2d 518 (Iowa
2000) (hedge-to-arrive contracts) see p. 83 su ra.
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The Agricultural Law Press presents
AGRICULTURAL TAX AND LAW SEMINARS
in Grand Island, Nebraska
by Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen
October 3-6, 2000 Best Western Riverside Inn, Grand Island, NE
Come join us for a world-class seminar on the hottest topics in agricultural tax and law in the heartland of American
agriculture. Space is limited for this wonderful opportunity to gain expert insight into agricultural law.
The seminar will be Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, October 3-6, 2000 at the Best Western Riverside Inn in
downtown Grand Island, NE. Registrants may attend one, two, three or all four days, with separate pricing for each
combination. On Tuesday, Dr. Harl will speak about farm and ranch income tax. On Wednesday, Dr. Harl will cover farm
and ranch estate tax. On Thursday, Roger McEowen will cover farm and ranch business planning. On Friday, Roger
McEowen will cover current developments in several other areas of agricultural law. Your registration fee includes
comprehensive annotated seminar materials for the days attended which will be updated just prior to the seminar. The
seminar materials will also be available on CD-ROM for a small additional charge. Continental buffet breakfasts and break
refreshments are also included in the registration fee.
Here are some of the major topics to be covered:
• Taxation of debt, taxation of bankruptcy, the latest on SE tax of rental of land to a family-owned entity; income
averaging; earned income credit; commodity futures transactions; paying wages in kind.
• Federal estate tax, including 15-year installment payment of federal estate tax, co-ownership discounts, alternate
valuation date, special use valuation, family-owned business deduction (FOBD), handling life insurance, marital deduction
planning, disclaimers, planning to minimize tax over deaths of both spouses, trusts, and generation skipping transfer tax.
• Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with future interests, handling estate freezes, and “hidden” gifts.
• Income tax aspects of property transfer, including income in respect of decedent, installment sales, private annuities,
self-canceling installment notes, and part gift/part sale transactions.
• Organizing the farm business--one entity or two, corporations, general and limited partnerships and limited liability
companies.
• Legal developments in farm contracts, secured transactions, bankruptcy, real property, water law, torts, and
environmental law.
Special room discounts are available at the hotel.  Be sure to tell them that you are attending the agricultural law
seminar.
The seminar registration fees    for current subscribers    to the Agricultural Law Digest, the Agricultural Law Manual, or
Principles of Agricultural Law are $175 (one day), $340 (two days), $490 (three days), and $620 (four days).  The
registration fees for     n nsubscribers    are $195, $380, $550 and $700, respectively. Please Note: the registration fees are
higher for registrations within 30 days prior to the seminar, so please call for availability and the correct fees. A registration
form is available online at www.agrilawpress.com
For more information, call/fax Robert Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958, or e-mail at robert@agr awpress.com
